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Abstract
This paper empirically explores the impact of bank size, holding company affiliation 
and the degree of branching on small business and farm lending through a conceptual analysis 
encompassing private information asymmetries inherent in these bank dependent borrowers. 
The study expands the literature by removing the influence of capital constraints in bank 
dependent lending through comparing real estate secured to non real estate loans in a reduced 
form model. Furthermore, it encompasses an allocation analysis over bank dependent loans, 
its large loan counterpart and other assets. Overall the findings indicate that not only small 
banks, but instate and more particularly one bank holding company banks devote more of 
their assets to small business and farm loans. Banks owned by out-of-state holding companies 
do not. Low to moderately branched banks are also active in these markets. In this respect 
the smaller, more simply structured bank may possess a relative advantage in the bank 
dependent loan market arising from the capacity to mitigate acute informational asymmetries.
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1. INTRODUCTION*
With increased consolidations among financial services firms and the continued breakdown 
of regulatory barriers, will some of the smaller, more simply structured banks remain due to some 
market niche? Our goal in this paper is to address this question through exploring the relative 
advantage, if it exists, of small and simple banks compared to large and complex banks as sources 
of small business credit, in particular, we posit that smaller, more simply structured banks may be 
better able to both acquire and process private information about small business borrowers than their 
larger and more complex banking counterparts.
On the one hand, because small business borrowers are unlikely to generate public 
information, private information is crucial for determining small business creditworthiness for both 
funding and monitoring. As argued by Nakamura (1994), private information assumes a different 
role in the larger consolidated entity, giving small banks an advantage in small business lending 
(SBL). Therefore large banks may experience informational diseconomies of scale in small business 
loans. This may be particularly so with respect to relationship driven credits, where knowledge of 
the customer is paramount over financial ratios (Berger et al, 1995; Berger and Udell, 1995).
On the other hand, large more complex banks also have an advantage in the provision of 
credit to small businesses. These institutions are more diversified, therefore can tolerate greater risk 
exposure despite inherent information asymmetries in SBL. Additionally, technologies improving 
the information gathering process have reduced costs, allowing credit scoring models in large banks
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to be a viable means of capturing an increasing share of the SBL market (Mester, 1997).
Previous attempts in the literature to address the issue of small business credit and bank 
structure focus primarily on size, and to some degree organizational complexity (Berger and Udell, 
1995; Berger, et al, 1995, 1998; Peek and Rosengren, 1995, 1998; Strahan and Weston, 1998; 
Jayaratne and Wolken, 1999). We expand the literature by examining the relative share of small 
business lending secured by real estate, thus removing the size effects of capital constraints on bank 
behavior' --an analysis not previously undertaken. We build on past research by including a business 
lending allocation test. We also extend our study of banking structure by incorporating small farm 
loans. Agricultural lending to small borrowers carry similar arguments as small business lending.
Our analysis proceeds in four additional sections, hi section two we provide a conceptual 
framework suggesting how size, structure and other variables might affect a bank’s ability for 
overcoming the acute private information asymmetries inherent in small business or farm borrowers- 
-i.e., what we term as bank dependent loans (BDL)‘. In section three we describe the data, its 
sources and the research methodology employed in the data analysis. In section four we present the 
empirical results. While we focus primarily on small business lending due to its greater volume, we 
find similar empirical results for small farm lending as well. Section five contains our conclusion.
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
There are two key, conflicting aspects governing the extent to which a bank may engage in
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'Regulation mandates that banks cannot extend credit to one borrower which exceeds a 
portion of the bank’s capital, thus limiting small banks’ activity in large loans.
-Since small businesses generally cannot look to the securities market as a funding 
source, they typically rely on banks as their primary creditor (Elliehausen and Wolken, 1990).
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bank dependent lending. One is the ability of a bank to process private information inherent in BDL. 
The other is the diversification of the bank improving its risk tolerance, thereby increasing its 
capacity to participate in BDL. Our empirical work, therefore, seeks to explain BDL both as a 
function of the attributes that affect a bank’s ability to process private information, and its 
diversification improving its ability to tolerate risk. Our hypothesis is that large banks and those 
with complex structures will process private information less well but nontheless will have a greater 
ability to diversify. Small, simple banks may be able to better process private information, but 
clearly will not have the relative ability to diversify risk.
Empirically, if diversification is more important than private information in BDL, then the 
coefficients on most variables representing large complex banking structures ought to show more 
BDL activity. If private information is more important, then we should find that the coefficients on 
most variables indicate smaller and simpler banking structures show a greater tendency for BDL. 
Thus if the variables in our regressions successfully capture our ideas, diversity versus private 
information, then we should see the coefficients are consistent in the results. Our reduced form 
specification is:
BDL = f  (SIZE. HOLDING COMPANY AFFILIATION, EXTENT OF BRANCHING; MARKET, RISK)
The first three sets of variables—size, holding company affiliation and extent of branching- 
capture larger size and complexity of structure, thereby implying greater diversification; whereas 
small size and simplicity of structure imply better private information. Market location and risk 
encompass other attributes that further distinguish these two ideas.
2.1 Dependent Variables
Our tests use three alternative measures of lending activity to illustrate the extent to which
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finannce 6(1) 2001
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the institutional variables described above alter banks’ participation in a market that is presumably 
bank dependent for credit. Following most of the papers in the literature, we use small business 
lending as a percentage of total assets (SBL/TA) as our standard dependent variable (Goldberg et 
a l 1998,1999; Berger et al, 1995,1998; Peek & Rosengren, 1998; Strahan & Weston, 1998; Keeton, 
1995).
Our second way of measuring the dependent variable is to account for the fact that not all 
assets are in business lending. Thus part of movement in SBL might also reflect movement in the 
larger loan counterpart (LBL) because of reallocation of the third asset pool. That is, movements 
in SBL by itself may be incomplete as a description of what is occurring in the bank portfolio mix, 
since banks have holdings in other types of lending, bonds, cash, etc.—the third asset pool. The 
ability to process private information or diversify might affect a bank’s choices in this regard. So, 
by measuring the difference of assets in small business loans and its large loan counterpart ((SBL- 
LBL)/TA) in tandem with our SBL/TA measurement, we are looking at how a bank chooses to 
allocate its assets among SBL, LBL and the remaining asset pool.
The third measure of BDL activity is unique in the literature and in our view is the clearest 
test of the private information versus diversity hypothesis. This measure capmres a second 
component of bank activity by looking just within the SBL category. We differentiate out of SBL 
its real estate secured component. We thereby put capital constraints aside and consider BDL 
activity net of any behavior influenced by legal lending limits imposed by regulatory authorities. The 
SBL/TA ratio is disaggregated into the difference between small commercial and industrial (SCI) 
loans and small commercial real estate (SCRE) loans as a percentage of total assets [(SCI- 
SCRE)/TA]. This last distinction is particulariy important, as the information content in non real
63
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estate bank dependent lending is especially difficult. Assessing credit risk is more difficult in SCI 
loans as compared to SCRE. Real estate collateral is generally straightforward to appraise, improves 
loan liquidity, and allows for easier assessment of risk exposure. Under conditions of stable or rising 
real estate prices SCRE loans require less monitoring. SCI loans include unsecured loans, or 
monitor-intensive loans made in some cases solely on the character of the borrower. Hence, they 
encompass relationship driven credits and are the more information sensitive subset. Thus, the 
allocation proces of SBL is not influenced by capital constraints. Rather, real estate may be obtained 
as collateral perhaps to overcome information gaps.
2.2 Small Farm Lending
Following Keeton (1996), Goldberg et al (1999) and Levonian (1-996) we also look at farm 
lending. While a much smaller market than SBL, we consider it bank dependent, having important 
distinctions regarding diversity versus private information. Again, our main interest is in size and 
complexity determining such distinctions across our set of tests. Similar to SBL, we examine the 
small farm loan to total asset ratio (SFL/TA). We also apply our asset allocation test to small and 
large farm loans ((SFL-LFL)/TA). Small farm lending is comprised of agriculmral production loans 
not secured by farmland (denoted by SFPR and roughly analogous to SCI) versus those loans that 
are (denoted by SFRE and roughly analogous to SCRE). We therefore apply our real estate secured 
test to these loans. We will look for a consistency of the farm lending to the small business results.
3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
The unit of observation for our empirical analysis is at the bank level. The new data on small
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business and small farm loans^ are extracted from the June 30, 1994 Bank Call reports. It is 
combined with branch level data from the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits which indicates primarily 
deposit information and branch location. Bank level holding company names and locations are 
obtained from Sheshunoff, Inc, a bank research firm. Our empirical analysis is based on the universe 
of approximately 1000 Texas banks for 1994. This sample provides a large degree of diversity, both 
among types of locations and types of banking structures. At the same time, by using only Texas 
banks, we are able to mirror the dichotomous structure of the U.S. banking industry while 
simplifying the regulatory environment.
There are four categories of loan size data available. Data on small business loans are 
categorized by number and dollar volume for $100,000 and less; $100,001 through $250,000; 
between $250,001 through $1,000,000, and over $1 million. Small farm lending categories are 
similar except they are capped at $500,000. (The average loan size in SFL is smaller than SBL in 
all categories, and farm lending also has lower dollar and number volume.) We therefore define SBL 
as loans $250,000 and less, while for small farms we use $100,000 and less.^ Three regressions, 
each encompassing the dependent variables previously described, are specified for SBL and SFL 
respectively. Each regression is a function of the vector of variables described above; SIZE, 
HOLDING CO., BRANCHING; MARKET LOCATION, RISK.
The SIZE variables consist of total assets (TA), and of a Herfindahl index (Case and Fair,
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finannce 6 (1) 2001
^The data are reported annually, and originally reported in the 1993 June call report. 
However, because of errors due to first-time reporting, the 1994 call is used. In order to avoid 
undue reporting burdens upon the banks, small businesses and farms are defined by the size of 
their original loan amount, rather than the size of the firm. Size of the business rather than size 
of the loan is a preferred measure. However, Scanlon (1984) has indicated that original loan size 
serves as a good proxy for borrower size.
■^Regression results using $250,000 as the alternate definition for SFL, and both $100,000 
and one million dollars for SBL are qualitatively similar to those reported.
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1999). We use the natural log of TA [Ln(TA)], since empirically we find declining marginal impact 
of TA on the share of assets in SBL or SFL. Further, we fmd size for urban banks has a statistically 
different impact than for rural banks, so we interact the Ln(TA) with the urban d u m m y T h e  
Herfindahl index (HHI) variable is included to separate absolute size of the bank from its presence 
in a market-i.e., concentration.
The HOLDING CO variables consist of three dummy variables to differentiate banks without 
any holding company affiliation, the omitted categoiy. The simplest holding company structure 
consists of only one bank (OBNKHC). The next is a multibank holding company domiciled within 
the state of Texas (INSMBHC). The most complex is a multibank holding company domiciled 
outside of the state (OSHC).^
Similarly to holding company status, the extent of branching is defined by a series of dummy 
variables. Low branching (LOBRNCH) is defined as a bank with branches confined to the local 
market area\ Moderate branching (MODBRNCH) is defined as all bank branches within a one 
hundred mile radius, while high branching (HIBRNCH) is defined by a bank’s branches extending 
beyond the one hundred mile limit. Unit banks, or banks without branches is the omitted variable. 
In addition we use two continuous variables, the number of bank branches (BRNCHNUM), and the 
share of deposits from outside the main bank’s market area (PDOUT).
The final group of variables are the market and risk orientation variables. An urban dummy 
variable (URBAN) equals one for banks with main offices in urban areas. BANKAGE indicates the
^Neither of these specification changes affect the coefficients of the remaining variables. 
I^n the case of a bank owned by one holding company which in turn is owned by another, 
the domicile of the highest holding company is used.
 ^For purposes of this research, the local market area is defined to be the MSA if the main 
bank is located in an urban area, otherwise the county.
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age of a bank in years. OCCEXAM is a dummy variable that equals one for banks examined by the 
Controller of the Currency (all national banks), while STATEXAM equals one for state chartered 
banks examined by the state department of banking. The omitted category is banks examined by the 
Federal Reserve.
Definitions of all the above right hand side variables are presented in Table 1, while Table
2 presents the means and standard deviations of the dependent and independent variables. The SFL 
regressions additionally contain an interaction of OBNKHC with URBAN to account for the 
statistically significant impact of rural OBNKHCs in small farm loans. In the small farm loan 
regressions, the 99 banks that have no agriculmral lending are dropped. This leaves 997 
observations for SBL and 898 for SFL.*
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Our results are strongly consistent with private information being more important than 
diversity. When just looking at the first SBL regression, private information dominates. However, 
these results are strengthened by our two alternative specifications. In the asset allocation regression, 
we find that LBL may rise at the expense of SBL and/or other assets. The results are further 
strengthened by our third regression, where we find that even within the category of SBL, the share 
in real estate loans dramatically falls with bank size and complexity. Thus our results are generally 
consistent across all three specifications and across the individual components of the independent 
variables. We find that private information is much more important as a motivation than diversity.
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finannce 6(1) 2001
^Tobit regressions including the 99 zeros were qualitatively similar to those reported 
here, although the individual coefficients are estimated less precisely.
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Furthermore, the story is the same in both SBL and SFL. Both reflect private information 
dominating over diversity. Overall, this is comparable to six separate tests, all reflecting a 
preponderance of evidence supporting private information.
Table 3 presents our results of bank participation in the SBL sector, using all three 
specifications of the dependent variable--i.e., SBL/TA , (SBL-LBL)/TA and (SC1-SCRE)/TA. The 
table reflects the coefficient estimates and the elasticities calculated at the mean of the continuous 
variables. Where the OLS regression errors are heteroscedastic (as determined by the White test), 
we report the robust errors as taken from the White heteroscedasticity-consistent variance-covariance 
matrix, although the outcome has no substantive differences from the original OLS results. Results 
of the small farm lending sector are presented in Table 4, and pertinent findings are discussed with 
the SBL results.
4.1. Size Variables
The negative signs on the Ln(TA) coefficients support the information hypothesis. Namely, 
as banks grow larger they engage less in BDL. Furthermore, the relatively high elasticities on the 
statistically significant coefficients show the effects are quantitatively important.
Additionally, we find urban and rural banks behave differently regarding SBL as they 
increase assets. Specifically, in the SBL/TA regression the share of SBL does not fall as rural banks 
grow larger. Despite that, our results show that even in rural areas, other assets are allocated to LBL 
as assets increase (SBL-LBL)/TA. That is, while the coefficient estimate is insignificant and 
quantitatively small in the SBL/TA regression (-.001 with e = -.01), other assets are allocated to 
LBL as the bank increases in size (regression two)^ However, within SBL, the share in real estate
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finannce 6(1) 2001
*^ The coefficient in (SBL-LBL)/TA is -.017 with e = -.23, while the coefficient in the 
SBL/TA regression is effectively zero. Thus the increase in LBL is a reallocation only from the
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secured credits increases (regression three). This says the more information sensitive type of loans 
have fallen as the rural banks grow, although the total SBL/TA ratio remains unchanged. In the 
urban areas, banks substitute out of SBL and other assets into LBL as the banks become bigger. 
Thus LBL grows partially at the expense of SBL, supporting the size effect of private information. 
However, large urban banks do not allocate a greater share of assets to real estate secured SBL. This 
could be the effects of credit scoring models lowering costs on the more information sensitive 
credits. Nontheless, as a whole, the asset size variables in SBL support the private information 
hypothesis.
In farm lending (table 4) we find the results support private information even more 
consistently. In both rural and urban banks the share of SFL and other assets fall as more assets are 
devoted to large farm lending (regressions one and two). Also, as both rural and urban banks grow 
larger, the share of farmland-secured loans increase (regression three), perhaps to mitigate 
informational diseconomies. In all three regressions for both urban and rural banks the results are 
statistically significant and quantitatively important (as reflected by the relatively high elasticities).
One possible reason for the rise in the large loan counterpart in both the SBL and SFL sectors 
is because large banks are not as constrained by the capital limitation on loan size. Therefore our 
third regression is germane since it removes the effects of capital constraints. Here for SBL, we see 
private information dominating over diversity in the large rural banks. For SFL we find this in both 
large rural and urban banks. However, large urban banks do not favor real estate secured SBL, 
perhaps due to offsetting effects of diversity.
Regarding size in relation to the market (bank concentration), HHI is significantly positive
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finannce 6(1) 2001
third asset category.
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with a relatively high elasticity in the (SCI-SCRE)/TA regression (and marginally significant in farm 
loans). This is consistent with the information hypothesis. The more concentrated the market, the 
greater the bank’s share of private information. Thus the bank is more likely to extend the more 
informationally intensive non real estate loans.
4.2. Holding Company Variables—Complexity
The holding company variables also support the information hypothesis. The negative 
statistical significance on the OSHC coefficient in the SBL/TA regression (-.020) has a high absolute 
value relative to the other holding company dummy variables. Additionally, the coefficient in the 
(SBL-LBL)/TA regression is quantitatively important (-.025) and marginally significant. This 
implies that these banks in more complex organizations (while holding size constant) not only hold 
lower proportions of assets in SBL, but allocate funds from SBL and other assets to LBL. These 
results reflect the negative impact of complexity on private information, in contrast, the INSMBHC 
banks reflect a preference for SBL in the business loan portfolio. The coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant in the (SBL-LBL)/TA regression (.018). While the proportion of total assets 
in SBL remains unchanged (the SBL/TA coefficient is effectively zero), the business portfolio mix 
reflects greater allocation to SBL arising from the substitution out of LBL to other assets. This 
outcome appears to undergird private information. Since in Texas INSMBHC banks are comprised 
primarily of smaller banks in close proximity, it is unlikely that stringent corporate governance 
policies are imposed on the member banks. Therefore private information flows relatively 
unimpeded within the instate holding company organization, but may be hampered in the OSHC 
banks.
For the OBNKHC variable all three SBL regressions point toward a dominance of private
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finannce 6(1) 2001
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information. Namely, the positive and statistically significant coefficients imply greater SBL activity 
in these simplest of holding company structures. This is further supported in all of the SFL 
regressions (Table 4) where rural OBNKHCs mimic these outcomes. Thus all six tests for 
complexity in the OBNKHC variable yield the same results. In these more simple structures, 
management may be more proactive in processing private information giving rise to a higher activity 
in SBL and SFL, including the more informationally intense component of these bank dependent 
loans.
4.3. Branching Variables—Complexity
LOBRNCH and MODBRNCH reflect a significantly positive relationship with SBL/TA and 
the informationally intense (SC1-SCRE)/TA regression (Table 3). In the SFL sector (Table 4) we find 
similar findings for MODBRNCH. This may be a result of advanced communication technology 
allowing for effective handling of private information flows in banks that are not overly branched. 
However, contrary to the information hypothesis, the positive and significant result of the 
HIBRANCH variable in the (SCI-SCRE)/TA and small versus large farm loan regressions may be 
more transaction driven business loans, or just the effect of diversity reducing risk in the more 
informationally intense loans. Finally, within the SFL sector, although the number of branches 
(BRNCHNUM) variable is positive and significant in all three regressions, the coefficient values are 
quantitavely unimportant. They are close to zero (.0004, .0005, .0003) and the relative elasticity is 
very small (.01,.02,.02).
4.4. Market Location and Risk
As expected, for small business lending the urban effect is positive and significant in the 
SBL/TA and (SBL-LBL)ZTA regressions (Table 3, columns 2 and 4). Additionally, the magnitude
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is higher than any other dummy variable, underscoring the strength of the urban location due to 
demand conditions. The small farm loan regression results for rural markets (Table 4) also bear this 
out (as indicated by the negative urban coefficients). In support of the information hypothesis, urban 
banks allocate more total assets to small farm land-secured loans, perhaps to compensate for greater 
difficulty in obtaining private information for farm lending in an urban setting~i.e., where there are 
fewer farms and higher population density and flux. (In SBL the negative relationship holds, 
although it is not significant.)
In our risk variables'^’, the significant negative results and the relatively high elasticities for 
BANKAGE in all three of the SBL regressions (Table 3) appear to support a less risk averse growth 
mode for young banks as well as a more conservative stance by older banks, consistent with the 
findings of Goldberg et al (1998, 1999)". And finally, the significant positive result for 
BANKAGE in the SFL/TA regression (Table 4, columns 2 and 3) has a relatively high elasticity, 
lending support to the information hypothesis. The expertise and private information required for 
farm lending is developed over time.
5. CONCLUSION
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"’As a further measure of risk, the percentage of problem loans as a portion of total assets 
is used as an additional variable in an unreported regression. The results are qualitatively the 
same. Problem loans include past due, nonaccrual and charged off loans from all t>pes of bank 
lending. Because this risk variable is potentially endogenous, it is not included in our model.
"Since many banks were acquired in the years just prior to our sample period, the 
acquisition may have had an effect on bank-customer relations in the acquired bank, thereby 
making the acquisition date important. To test for misspecification of BANKAGE in light of 
this, the variable was omitted from the regression. The results, however, were qualitatively the 
same.
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Since financial intermediation theory is ambiguous as to the impact of bank structure on total 
assets invested in bank dependent lending, empirical examination is required. Therefore this paper 
investigates whether small, simply structured banks are better at bank dependent lending because of 
possible efficiencies in processing private information; or conversely, whether large banks with more 
complex structure are better because of diversity allowing greater risk capacity to invest in BDL. 
We find in our reduced form model that private information dominates over diversity as a 
determinate of BDL. Our evidence is considerably stronger because we specify the dependent 
variables in three different ways and across two different types of activity. Since our real estate 
versus non real estate bank dependent lending removes the effects of capital constraints, it is actually 
our clearest test. However, in just focusing on SBL (as with our first test), or looking at the 
distinction in total business lending holding constant the third asset pool (our second test), we get 
similar results across the set of variables.
Overall our findings indicate that not only small banks, but instate and more particularly one 
bank holding company banks devote more of their assets to small business and farm loans. Banks 
owned by out-of-state holding companies do not. Low to moderately branched banks are also active 
in these markets. Thus the evidence from our reduced form model strongly weighs toward better 
information flows in more simplistic structures, in contrast to diversity allowing for more risk.
Despite this, there is a limit to the private information argument. Unit banks (no branch 
banks) and no holding company banks do not have higher BDL activity. This may indicate that some 
diversity is good for bank dependent lending. Nevertheless, from the results of this research, private 
information appears to be the more important motivation. Therefore, the unique nature of bank 
dependent lending coupled with the consolidation process may have implications for bank structure-
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finannce 6(1) 2001
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namely, a two-tiered banking industry with smaller and simply structured banks having a relative 
advantage in supplying the market for bank dependent entities.
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finannce 6(1) 2001
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Total assets in the denominator of the dependent variable causes some econometric 
measurement error that arises from also having the log of total assets as an independent variable. 
However, this measurement is frequently used in banking papers, some of which are previously cited 
in our text. Furthermore, by relinquishing the bank dependent loan to asset ratio as the dependent 
variable, the concept of specialization in these types of loans as well as the asset allocation test are 
lost. Nevertheless, to account for the measurement error, the natural log of SBL, the ratios of large 
business loans to small business loans (LBL/SBL) and small commercial real estate loans to small 
commercial and industrial loans (SCRE/SCl) are run as the dependent variables in an alternative 
specification, the results of which are contained in Table Al. The same is done with small farm 
lending, with results reflected in Table A2.
The results of the small business loan regressions under this alternative specification are 
similar to the loan to asset specification used in the research'". Overall, this suggests that any 
measurement error that may exist in the loan to asset specification does not cloud the small business 
lending results. Although the results of the small farm lending in the alternative specification of the 
log of SFL are similar to the farm loan to asset regression in Table 4, the remaining two regression 
coefficient estimates are less precise, but do not contradict Table 4. However, since the small 
business loan to asset specification is supported by the alternative specification, and since SBL has 
a larger dollar and number volume, and is of greater concern in the literature, then perhaps what 
specification is best for business loans should be applied to farm loans, as is done in this research.
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finannce 6 (1) 2001
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'-The signs switch on the ratio regressions since SBL and SFL are in the denominator. 
This is done to avoid zero as a divisor for the many banks that report no large business or farm 
loans.
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Table 1: EXPLANATORY VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
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RHS VARIABLES DEFINITION
Size Variables
LNTA Size in Relation to Total Bank Deposits 
the natural log of total assets
LNTAURB an interaction temi of urban location and the natural log of total assets 
to separately account for the size effect in urban versus rural location
HHl Size in Relation to the Market—Bank Concentration 
a Herfindahl index, or the sum of squared market share constructed 
from the branch level data, measures the concentration of banks within 
the local market. Higher values indicate more market concentration.
Holdina Comnanv 
Variables
The omitted variable is unaffiliated banks-i.e., banks without any 
holding company structure, or “No-Holding-Company-Banks”
OSHC a dummy variable for membership in a multibank holding company 
domiciled out of Texas
INSMBHC a dummy variable for membership in a multibank holding company 
domiciled within the state
OBNKHC a dummy variable for membership in a bank holding company with that 
bank being the only bank. In SFL, OBNKHC is interacted with 
URBAN
Branchina Variables For the dummy variables, unit banks (banks having no branches) is the 
omined variable
LOBRNCH a dummy variable which equals one if the bank is branched only within 
the bank market, zero otherwise
MODBRNCH a dummy variable which equals one if the bank is branched within 100 
miles of the bank market, zero otherwise
HIBRNCH a dummy variable which equals one if the bank is branched outside 100 
miles of the bank market, zero otherwise
BRNCHNUM the number of branches of a particular bank
PDOUT the percentage of deposits located outside of the main bank’s market 
area
Market Location. Risk
URBAN a dummy variable equalmg one for an urban location of the main office 
of the bank, zero otherwise
BANKAGE the time in years since the bank was chartered
OCCEXAM accounts for regulatory differences of national banks. The omitted 
variable represents banks examined by the Federal Reser\-e
STATEXAM accounts for regulatory differences of state chartered banks examined 
by the Texas Department of Banking
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TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
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Small Business Lending f1 Small Farm  Lending
Dependent Variables Mean Banks Std Dev 11 Mean Banks Std Dev
SBL/TA 0.1133 997 0.0720 1
(SBL-LBL)/TA 0.0738 997 0.0979
(SCI-SCRE)n’A 0.0186 997 0.0504
SFL/TA 0.0541 898 0.0691
(SFL-LFD/TA 0.0383 898 0.0788
(SFPR-SFR£)/TA 1 0.0299 898 0.0534
Explanaton' Variables
Size
LNTA 10.8988 997 1.0101 1 10.9134 898 1.0297
LNTAURB 5.7663 997 5.6511 11 5.2581 898 5.6825
HHl 0.2510 997 0.1872 1I 0.2642 ■ 898 0.1915
Holding Company ■
OSHC 0.0391 39 0.1940 11 0.0390 35 0.1936
INSMBHC 0.1374 137 0.3445 1 0.1403 126 0.3475
ONEBNKHC 0.4142 413 0.4928 1 0.4298 386 0.4953
OBHCURB N/A N/A N/A 0.1893 170 0.3920
Branching
LOBRNCH 0.2548 254 0.4359 1 0.2461 221 0.4310
MODBRNCH 0.1194 119 0.3244 1 0.1281 115 0.3343
HIBRNCH 0.0271 27 0.1624 1 0.0278 25 0.1646
BRNCHNUM 1.8355 997 12.8924 1 I.94I0 898 13.5688
PDOUT 0.0452 997 0.1301 I1 0.0491 898 0.1354
Market, Risk
URBAN 0.5155 514 0.5000 I 0.4666 419 0.4992
BANKAGE 50.9684 997 34.6334 I 54.1842 898 34.2623
OCCEXAM 0.4925 491 0.5002 1 0.4911 441 0.5002
STATEXAM 0.4594 458 0.4986 I1 0.458797 412 0.4986
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TABLE 3: SMALL BUSINESS LENDING REGRESSION RESULTS
N=997 SBL/TA (SBL-LBL)/
TA
(SCI-
SCREVTA
\  AR.
NAME
COEFF.
E S I.
ROBUST
ERR
Elas­
ticity
COEFF.
EST.
ROBUST
ERR
Elas­
ticity
COEFF.
EST.
STANDARD
ERR
Elas­
ticity
INTERCEPT 0.149***
0.043
0.269***
0.052
0.094***
0.034
LNTA'^ -0.001
0.004
-0.01 -0,017***
0.005
-0.23 -0.007**
0.003
-0.37
LNTAURB'" -0.021***
0.004
-0.19 -0.052***
0.005
-0.70
-0.002
0.009
-0.11
HHI -0.002
0.014
0.00 -0.007
0.015
-0.02 0.041***
0.011
0.54
OSHC -0.020**
0.010
-0.025
0.018
0.001
0.009
INSMBHC 0.004
0.007
0.018**
0.008
-0.005
0.005
OBNKHC 0.009**
0.005
0.020***
0,006
0.006*
0.004
LOWBRNCH 0.011**
0.006
0.005
0.008
0.007*
0.004
MODBRNCH 0.018*
0.011
0.012
0.014
0.017*
0.008
HIBRNCH -0.001
0.019
-0.019
0.029
0.036**
0.015
BRNCHNUM
X 10^
-0.010
.016
0.00 0.027
.0275
0.01 -0.013
.016
-0.01
PDOUT 0.048
0.038
0.02 0.083*
0.047
0.05 -0.031
0.024
-0.07
URBAN 0.235***
0.056
0.379***
0.074
-0.056
0.042
BANKAGE
X 10^
-0.060***
.006
-0.27 -0.031***
.008
-0.22 -0.021***
.005
-0.56
OCCEXAM -0.006
0.012
0.001
0.016
-0.006
0.008
STATEXAM -0.017
0.012
-0.008
0.016
-0.010
0.008
***Significant at the 1 % level; **5% level; * 10% level. Elasticity (e) is calculated for the continuous variables.
'■'Because this variable has been interacted with URBAN, the coefficient estimate represents rural banks.
'■^This variable is the interaction of LNTA and urban. The reported coefficient results are urban banks. It 
is the sum of the coefficients on LNTA and LXTAURB. LNTAURB errors have been adjusted to equal (Variance 
IVT X -  Variance i.ntai'rd 2*Covariance)'-
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TABLE 4: SMALL FARM LENDING REGRESSION RESULTS
N=898 SFL/TA (SFL-
LFD/TA
(SFPR-
SFRE>/TA
VAR.
NAME
COEFF.
EST.
ROBUST
ERROR
£
Elas­
ticity
COEFF.
EST.
ROBUST
ERROR
e
Elas­
ticity
COEFF.
EST.
ROBUST
ERROR
Elas­
ticity
£
INTERCEPT 0.374***
0.052
0.449***
0.059
0.259***
0.043
LNTA'-^ -0.030***
0.005
-0.56 -0.037***
0.005
-0.97 -0.022***
0.004
-0.73
LNTAURB'" -0.015***
0.002
-0.28 -0.019***
0.007
-0.50 -0.010*
0.006
-0.33
HHI 0.023
0.015
0.11 -0.018
0.020
-0.13 0.020
0.012
0.18
OSHC -0.002
0.005
-0.004
0.009
0.001
0.004
INSMBHC 0.005
0.006
0.007
0.007
0.002
0.004
OBNKHC 0.032***
0.007
0.022***
0.009
0.022***
0.006
OBHCURB 0.001
0.004
0.002
0.004
0.000
0.003
LOWBRNCH -0.001
0.004
0.003
0.005
0.002
0.004
MODBRNCH 0.024***
0.009
0.025**
0.011
0.017*
0.007
HI BRANCH 0.022
0.014
0.038**
0.018
0.015
0.011
BRNCHNUM
X 10^
0.038***
.009
0.01 0.047***
.108
0.02 0.023***
.006
0.02
PDOUT -0.035
0.028
-0.03 -0.039
0.037
-0.01 -0.015
0.021
-0.03
URBAN -0.187***
0.055
-0.221***
.006
-0.138***
0.045
BANKAGE
X 10-
0.016***
.006
0.16 0.009
.007
0.13 0.008
.005
0.14
OCCEXAM -0.002
0.010
-0.010
0.011
-0.006
0.009
STATEXAM -0.008
0.010
-0.014
0.011
-0.009
0.009
***S ign ir ican t  al the T’o leve l ;** 5%  level;  * 1 0 %  level.E las tic ity  (e) is ca lcu la ted  for the  c o n t in u o u s  var iab le s  on ly .
' 'B eca u se  this variable has been  interacted w ith U R B A N , the c o e ff ic ie n t  estim ate represents rural banks. 
T his a lso  app lies  to O B N K H C .
'^ ’T h is variable is the interaction o f  L K T A  and urban. T he reported c o ef f ic ie n t  results are urban banks. It 
is the sum  o f  the c o effic ie n ts  on L N T A  and L N T A U R B . L N T A U R B  errors have  been  adjusted to equal (V arian ce  
, +  V ariance , nt-m rh ~  2 * C o v a r ia n c e )' - T h is  a lso  app lies  to  OBNICH C and O B H C U R B .
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Table A1: Alternative Specification. Small business Lendinti
N=996,994 LNSBL
N=994
LBL/SBL
N=996
SCRE/SCl
N=994
VAR. COEFF. COEFF. COEFF.
NAME EST. EST. EST.
TSTA T r s r ^ r - A d j TSTAT
(OLS) for Robust 
Errors
(OLS)
INTERCEPT -2.759 -1 944*** -1.655
-5.899 ' -3.583 -1.188
LNTA'- 1.044*** 0.235*** 0.288**
23,997 4.144 2.224
LNTAURB 0.850*** 0.537*** -0.026
23.395 6.787 -0.240
HHl 0.022 0.032 -0.918**
0.146 0.283 -2.049
OSHC -0.264** 0.574 -0.332
-2.097 1.390 -.891
INSMBHC 0.027 0.025 -0.063
0.394 0.143 -0.202
OBNKHC 0.114** -0.080* -0.298**
2.355 -1.856 -2.084
LOBRNCH 0.148*** -0.220*** -0.112
2.639 **-"2.569 -.677
MODBRNCH 0.264** -0.332** -0.594*
2.336 -2.138 -1.773
HIBRNCH 0.035 -0.129 -0.891
0.170 -.370 -1.468
BRNCHNUM -0.009*** 0.060*** -0.002
-3.957 5.099 -0.352
PDOUT 0.132 -0.223 1.924**
0.414 -.549 2.044
URBAN 2.307*** -3.002*** 3.183*
4.022 -3.158 1.863
BANKAGE -0.005*** -0.002** -0.001
-8.241 -1.939 -0.316
OCCEXAM 0.020 -0.140 0.057
0.194 -.655 0.190
STATEXAM -0.070 -0.188 0.281
-0.688 -.900 0.938
♦♦♦Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at 
OLS is used where no heteroscedasticity is found in the regression errors.
the 10% level
'"Because this variable has been interacted with URBAN in the LNTAURB variable, the coefficient 
estimate represents rural banks, whereas LNTAURB represents urban banks. LNTAURB errors have been adjusted 
to equal (Variance inta + Variance i . n t a u r r  V  2*Covariance)' '
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Table A2: Alternative Specification, Small Farm Lending
N=879,791 LNSFL
N=879
LFL/SFL
N=879
SFRE/SFPR
N=791
VAR. COEFF. EST. COEFF. EST. COEFF. EST.
NAME TSTA T  
(Adjusted for 
Robust 
Errors)
7 5 r /l7 (O L S ) T ST A T  (OI.S)
INTERCEPT 0.706 -5.968 0.888
0.762 -.818 .287
LNTA'*^ 0.537=^** 0.481 0.160
6.344 .708 .555
LNTAURB 0.213** 3.969*** 0.764**
2.234 6.399 2.668
HHI 0.418* 1.648 -0.896
1.699 .699 -0.902
OSHC 0.008 -3.393 -0.135
0.032 -1.609 -0.136
INSMBHC -0.055 -0.139 -0.217
-0.327 -0.124 -.442
OBNKHC 0.408*** -0.089 0.101
3.479 -0.088 0.236
OBNKHCURB 0.182 1.908* -0.132
1.044 1.665 -2A1
LOBRNCH -0.209 0.522 -0.233
-1.503 0.551 0.550
MODBRNCH 0.406* -1,779 -0.590
1.683 -.968 -.742
HIBRNCH 0.289 -4.581 -1.074
0.620 -1.319 -.728
BRNCHNUM 0.005 -0.052 -0.028*
0.777 -1.500 -1.898
PDOUT -0.232 .502 .139
-0.348 .097 0.063
URBAN 2.304* -36.598*** -5.933
1.753 -3.944
-1.456
BANKAGE 0.013*** 0.013 -0.011**
8.294 1.191 -2.279
OCCEXAM 0.017 0.571
-0.817
0.059 0.335 -1.074
STATEXAM 0.047 -0.092
-0.456
0.162 -0.054
-0.601
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level 
OLS is used where no heteroscedasticity is found in the regression errors.
Because this variable has been interacted with URBAN in the LNTAURB variable, the coefficient 
estimate represents rural banks, whereas LNTAURB represents urban banks. LNTAURB errors have been adjusted 
to equal (Variance i + Variance i.ntaurb 2*Covariance)' ’ This also applies to ONBKHC and 
OBNKHCURB.
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